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Abstract 
 
Entrepreneurial biotech and large pharmaceutical firms often form alliances to co-develop new 
products. Yet new product development (NPD) is fraught with challenges that often result in 
project suspensions and failures. Considering this, how can firms increase the chances that their 
co-development alliances will create value? To answer this question, the authors build on insights 
from signaling theory to argue that prior project suspensions provide positive signals leading to 
an increase in value creation, while project failures have the opposite effect. In addition, drawing 
on insights from temporal construal theory, this research predicts that the strength of these effects 
is contingent on the stage along the exploration-exploitation continuum at which the alliance is 
formed. The authors undertook event study analyses of 248 alliances formed by 104 
biotechnology firms from the US and Europe listed on eight stock exchanges over an eight-year 
period between 1996 and 2003. The results confirm that prior NPD project suspensions have a 
stronger value creation effect (or a weaker value destruction effect) in the case of exploration 
alliances in the upstream of NPD processes than in the case of moderate-scale exploitation 
alliances in the downstream of NPD. This study is among the first to examine how both prior 
NPD project suspensions and failures of firms affect the abnormal returns achieved from co-
development alliances. This research therefore contributes to the innovation literature by honing a 
better understanding of setbacks and failures in NPD. Moreover, the findings contribute to the 
literature on strategic alliances by identifying new conditions under which firms can create or 
preserve value. Third, this research contributes to signaling theory by providing evidence of the 
moderation effect caused by the signaling environment. Finally, this study contributes to the 
entrepreneurial literature on value creation for entrepreneurial firms in alliances following 
adverse events. 
 
 
Practitioner Points  
• Managers should be aware that signaling suspensions and failures to investors can 
influence their expectations of future NPD performance and consequently impact 
shareholder value created through subsequent NPD alliances. 
• Proactive portfolio management, including de-prioritization of existing projects while 
allocating and re-allocating resources to active projects, can send out positive signals to 
investors to create better value in NPD alliances.  
• For those firms planning to build a culture of tolerance towards failure, entering co-
development alliances may be more desirable at exploratory stages of the NPD process 
than later on.  
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Introduction 
In high-tech industries, entrepreneurial firms are a driving force for innovation. Yet they 
may lack the critical resources and capabilities required to exploit their inventions. These firms 
often form co-development alliances with large, incumbent firms to access complementary assets 
and capabilities that are necessary to develop and commercialize inventions in their NPD process 
(Fang, 2008; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Wuyts, Dutta, and Stremersch, 2004). Prior research 
has shown that such alliances enhance an entrepreneurial firm’s product innovation (George, 
Zahra and Wood, 2002; Kelley and Rice, 2002), and provide opportunities for inter-
organizational learning that boost the firm’s commercialization abilities (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 
2004; Holmqvist, 2003).  
At the same time, prior research has recognized that both alliances and NPD projects are 
difficult tasks for managers (Emden, Calantone, and Droge, 2006; Henard and Szymanski, 2001; 
Montoya-Weiss and Calantone, 1994). Alliances are fraught with problems, ranging from partner 
selection (Emden, Calantone and Droge, 2006) to how best to manage the alliance to create value 
for the partners (Yang, Zheng and Zhao, 2014). In particular, entrepreneurial firms are difficult to 
evaluate for investors and alliance partners alike because they lack a performance track record or 
even previous revenues (Shane and Stuart, 2002). Therefore, in evaluating an entrepreneurial 
firm, investors have to rely on observable attributes or “signals” to assess the unobserved quality 
of a firm’s technology and NPD projects (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybel, 1999), such as a prestigious 
board of directors (Certo, Daily, and Dalton, 2001; Spence, 1973). Furthermore, as many as three 
out of four NPD projects fail (Cooper, 1990), and setbacks and dead ends are commonplace (Van 
de Ven et al., 1999). These may arise due to a range of issues associated with the NPD process, 
firm strategy, culture, resources, and commitment (Barczak, Griffin and Kahn, 2009; see e.g. 
Henard and Szymanski, 2001, and Montoya-Weiss and Calantone, 1994, for reviews). Managers 
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may thus ask a key question: bearing in mind the inherent difficulties of co-developing new 
products in alliances, how can entrepreneurial firms manage the tasks involved in creating value? 
Prior research has indicated that entrepreneurial firms’ ability to weather adverse events 
such as NPD withdrawals depends on the stock of projects in the NPD pipeline, alliance partners, 
and the firms’ ability to work with them (Baron, 2000; De Carolis, et al, 2009; Hoang and 
Rothaermel, 2005). While this last factor has been well documented in prior research, 
comparatively little is known about the impact of past NPD setbacks on entrepreneurial firms’ 
ability to create value with new co-development alliances. Yet the experience of NPD setbacks is 
a commonplace aspect of the innovation journey for many entrepreneurial firms. During their 
NPD processes, entrepreneurial firms deal with projects which fail to pass screening gates and are 
abandoned, as well as ones which are put on hold if the timing is not right or there are other, 
better projects that require the same resources (Cooper, 2008). While some projects may be 
pursued at a later date when the prioritization and timing issues are resolved (Cooper and Edgett, 
2012) and may help to improve new product quality in the end (McNally, Akdeniz and 
Calantone, 2011), NPD setbacks are costly (De Carolis, et al, 2009) and may negatively impact 
firm performance (Lokshin, Hagedoorn and Letterie, 2011). This indicates that different types of 
NPD setbacks have both positive and negative performance consequences and signal different 
abilities (or a lack of them) on the part of entrepreneurial firms. Therefore, prior NPD setbacks 
can be important signals for investors when firms enter into co-development alliances.  
In this article, the authors consider the role played by prior NPD setbacks in value 
creation through new co-development alliances by (1) differentiating between positive signals 
from prior project suspensions and negative signals from prior project failures, and (2) 
considering the strength of these effects. This depends on the stage along the exploration-
exploitation continuum at which the alliance is formed, where exploration is described as 
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activities related to experimentation with new alternatives, which yields distant and uncertain 
returns, and exploitation involves the refinement and extension of existing technologies, which 
yields returns that are closer and more predictable (March 1991; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).  
This research relies on signaling theory as a theoretical framework (Spence, 1973; 2002). 
A particular challenge for investors seeking to assess the quality of entrepreneurial firms is 
information asymmetry, which is a serious issue when establishing new alliances. It is argued that 
an entrepreneurial firm’s prior project suspensions provide a positive signal to investors and 
partners that it has robust and marketable ideas which could be capitalized on with a new product 
co-development alliance, leading to increased value creation. In contrast, entrepreneurial firms’ 
prior project failures are negative signals reflecting their issues in the technology portfolios; they 
may reduce these firms’ attractiveness and raise alliance costs for prospective partners, thus 
exerting a negative effect on the firms’ ability to create value through such alliances.  
Prior literature has suggested that the inter-organizational signaling effects can be 
moderated by the influence of the task environment (Sanders and Boivie, 2004). Therefore, this 
study further argues that they are contingent on the signaling environment (Connelly et al., 2011) 
of the alliance announcement, and in particular the stage of NPD (along the exploration-
exploitation continuum) at which the alliances are formed. This continuum starts with upstream 
exploration activities, followed by downstream exploitation activities (including moderate-scale 
and large-scale exploitations). By drawing insights from construal theory (Trope and Liberman, 
2003), this research hypothesizes that, for the signals of prior project suspensions and failures, 
exploration alliances in the upstream of NPD add more to the positive value creation of 
suspensions (or do more to counter the value damage of failures) than moderate-scale 
exploitation alliances in the downstream of NPD. According to construal theory, when investors 
evaluate the value of a firm in an exploitation alliance pursuing downstream NPD activities, they 
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tend to focus on how likely the future NPD is to succeed. For moderate-scale, downstream 
exploitation alliances, there is a very high failure rate before projects can reach final 
commercialization, suggesting a high level of uncertainty and risk (Heide and John, 1990); 
investors thus tend to see prior project suspensions and failures as being of less value at this 
stage. In contrast, judging an entrepreneurial firm in an NPD alliance in the upstream 
development stages of exploration, investors are less likely to focus on the feasibility of future 
NPD success because the finalization of the development process and the product’s market 
introduction are distant in time. Instead, they will focus more on the desirability of the 
explorations alliance (the value of a successful new product launch), and their perception of its 
value will thus be higher. These tendencies have been long described in literature on the behavior 
of future optimism, where people tend to harbor more positive expectations of distant outcomes 
(Mitchell et al., 1997; Trope and Liberman, 2003). 
 To test their hypotheses, the researchers collected data on 248 NPD alliances formed by 
104 biopharmaceutical firms over an eight-year period between 1996 and 2003 in eight stock 
exchanges in the USA and Europe. This research adopted the alliance formation event as the unit 
of analysis, and used a standard event study methodology to capture value creation upon new 
alliance formation by measuring abnormal stock market returns around the time of alliance 
announcement (e.g., Gulati and Wang, 2003; Swaminathan and Moorman, 2009). The analyses 
support the hypotheses. 
This article seeks to make several contributions to the literature. First, this study is among 
the first to examine how both prior NPD suspensions and failures of firms affect the abnormal 
returns achieved from co-development alliances. The findings contribute to the innovation 
literature by honing a better understanding of setbacks and failures in NPD (Barczak, 2014). NPD 
is perceived to be ‘among the essential processes for success, survival and renewal of 
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organizations, particularly for firms in either fast-paced or competitive markets’ (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1995, p. 344). It is commonly acknowledged that NPD suspensions and failures are 
frequent among high-technology firms. Few extant studies have explored the issue of suspensions 
and failures, and even fewer have related suspensions and failures to the variance in performance 
outcomes. In this study, the researchers unpack the impact of prior suspensions and failures, and 
provide a richer view of their different effects, which may suggest mechanisms for promoting or 
preventing effective learning and creating value (cf. Barczak, 2014).  
Second, the findings also contribute to the literature on strategic alliances by identifying 
the conditions in which firms can create or preserve value (Merchant and Schendel, 2000). 
Recent research has looked into the different conditions of value creation in alliances, including 
different past experiences of alliances, such as general vs. partner-specific experience (Gulati, 
Lavie and Singh, 2009), the strategic fit and industry fit of the focal firm (Yamakawa, Yang and 
Lin, 2011), and the size and type of partners in an alliance (Yang, Zheng and Zhao, 2014). This 
study contributes to this literature by highlighting the collective impact of project suspensions 
and failures on firms’ financial performance in a critical innovation activity, namely co-
development alliances.  
Third, this research also contributes to signaling theory by providing evidence of the 
moderation effect caused by the signaling environment (Lester et al., 2006), which remains an 
understudied area in the application of signaling theory (Connelly at al., 2011). This study 
suggests that the strength of signaling effects of prior suspensions and failures is contingent on 
the changing signaling environment along the exploration-exploitation continuum on which the 
alliance is formed.  
Finally, this study contributes to the entrepreneurial literature on value creation for 
entrepreneurial firms in alliances during adverse events (De Carolis, et al, 2009). It is well 
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understood that adverse events have a negative performance impact at the time of occurrence (De 
Carolis et al, 2009), and there is also evidence that failure experience can be learnt from, leading 
to longer-term success (McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 1999). This study adds to this literature by 
demonstrating the circumstances in which the past setbacks of entrepreneurial firms can create or 
reduce value long after the adverse effect has occurred.  
 
Literature review  
Project suspension and failure defined  
Innovation processes are characterized by multiple temporal rhythms and experiences 
(Cooper, 2008; Garud, Tuertscher, and Van de Ven, 2013). This implies that the management of 
NPD projects is complex to the extent it requires temporal coordination (Cooper et al., 1998; 
1999). It is also complex because managers need to balance the sometimes-conflicting tasks of 
maximizing expected economic returns, minimizing potential risk, and maintaining diversity in 
the NPD portfolio, all with limited resources (Blau et al., 2004). In addition, uncertainty and 
constraints such as those resulting from organizational structure or insufficient resources and 
knowledge make NPD project management a challenging process, and managers need to monitor 
existing projects constantly with a view of accelerating some of them while killing, suspending or 
deprioritizing others in order to allocate or re-allocate resources to active projects (Cooper et al., 
1998; 1999).   
To deal with such complexity, different temporal coordination mechanisms have been 
developed, including the stage-gate mechanism, in which “gates” are positioned at places along 
the product development process that are most beneficial to facilitating performance evaluation 
and enabling management to make “go /kill / hold / recycle” decisions on the project (Cooper, 
1990; 2008). A project can fail when objective performance information indicates that the only 
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rational option is to cancel the project prior to its completion because of technical failures or a 
violation of budgetary or time constraints (Cooper, 2003; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1990). 
Where the decision is less clear-cut, a project may be suspended, that is to say effectively put on 
hold, for it potentially to continue at a later date when the resource, prioritization, timing and 
technical issues have been resolved (Cooper and Edgett, 2012).  
It follows from the literature reviewed above that there are two principal types of 
decision, which managers can take when a project needs to be stopped at any particular stage. 
Firstly, the project can be “killed.” Such project failure occurs when the project cannot satisfy the 
screening criteria required to proceed further and is evaluated as a poor investment (Cooper, 
2003; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1990; Cooper and Edgett, 2012). Secondly, the project can be 
put on hold, or suspended. In contrast to project failures, suspended projects “pass” the screening 
gate (Cooper and Edgett, 2012: p.53) but need to be paused for other reasons. Therefore, on their 
own, suspended projects can be good investments (Cooper et al., 2002). In sum, the first critical 
difference between project suspensions and failures is whether they pass the screening criteria 
and are evaluated as having good investment potential, all else being equal. 
The second difference between project failures and suspensions is that the possibility of 
restarting a failed project which has been killed is low, while a suspended project can be restarted 
more readily. A failed project is typically stopped permanently. In contrast, a typical reason why 
a project is suspended is because the timing is not right or there are other, better projects that 
require the same resources. Suspended projects may continue at a later date when the resource 
constraints and prioritization and timing issues have been resolved (Cooper and Edgett, 2012); 
once the resources become available, then, suspended projects can be reactivated. 
The resources can be obtained internally or come from outside of the firm, in particular 
from a co-development alliance. When a project is not viable due to a lack of complementary 
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assets (Brown, 1997), such assets can come from external sources such as customer ideas or 
alliances (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; von Hippel, 1978). Similarly, knowledge can be obtained 
both from within and outside firm boundaries (Ahuja, Lampert, and Tandon, 2008; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). In particular, research has shown that external 
knowledge accessed from R&D alliance partners impacts NPD positively (Deeds and Hill, 1996; 
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).  
Associated with resource availability are timing issues. For project suspensions, timing 
issues may be resolved at a later date, and the same applies to problems with resources. Although 
there is no specification on how long a project suspension may last (and technically a suspension 
can be put on hold permanently and therefore becomes a failure), the literature implies that 
suspension should be short-term and temporary and may vary across different projects and 
industries (Cooper et al., 2002; Cooper and Edgett, 2012). Importantly, what is put on hold at one 
point in time may become viable later (Van de Ven et al., 1999). In sum, the ability to reactivate a 
project when timing issues are resolved and resources become available, possibly from a co-
development alliance partner, distinguishes suspended projects from failed projects. 
Because of the two differentiating features of project suspensions and failures, the former 
may signal to outsiders that the focal firm has positive and marketable ideas but lacks certain 
resources required to continue the projects. However, project failures may signal problems 
(Girotra, Terwiesch and Ulrick, 2007).  
Signaling theory  
Prior project suspensions and failures can be important signals when an NPD alliance is 
announced (Spence, 1973; 2002).  In the high-tech industries, investors face significant risk when 
investing in entrepreneurial firms because of the high level of uncertainty affecting these firms. 
With their products still in the development stage, they typically do not have a track record of 
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successful product launches and may not generate any revenues (Shane and Stuart, 2002). In 
addition, they have high technical and commercial failure rates (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). At the 
same time, there are severe information asymmetries between entrepreneurial firms and investors 
because the firms possess more information about the quality of their technologies and NPD 
projects than outside investors do (Shane and Stuart, 2002). As a result, when evaluating an 
entrepreneurial firm, investors have to rely on observable attributes or “signals” (e.g., patent 
citations and outcomes of prior NPD projects) to assess the unobserved quality of the technology 
and NPD projects of the firm (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybel, 1999). In this article, prior project 
suspensions and failures are conceptualized as useful “signals” for investors evaluating the value-
creation potential of new co-development alliances in particular. 
To this end, signaling theory suggests that information asymmetry problems are mitigated 
by signals conveying useful information (Spence, 1973; 2002). Signaling theory is frequently 
cited in the entrepreneurship literature (Lester et al., 2006), marketing literature (Kirmani and 
Rao, 2000), and NPD literature (Akdeniz, Calantone and Voorhees, 2014). It describes the 
process by which the signaler (the entrepreneurial firm) sends a signal that is received by the 
receiver (potential investors and alliance partners) within a certain signaling environment 
(Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel, 2005; Cohen and Dean, 2005). In this process, signals and the 
signaling environment determine the receiver’s evaluation of the signaler’s quality or value.  
Signal 
In the context of NPD alliances in drug discovery, entrepreneurial firms are difficult to 
evaluate for investors because they lack a performance track record or even revenues (Shane and 
Stuart, 2002). Therefore, such firms send signals to indicate their unobservable quality and gain 
legitimacy (Rao, Chandy and Prabhu, 2008). Such signals include having prestigious boards of 
directors (Certo, Daily, and Dalton, 2001) or top managers (Lester et al., 2006), maintaining 
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resources such as technology and patents (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Levitas and McFadyen, 2009), 
and engaging in alliances and NPD projects (Hoenig and Henkel, 2015; Rao, Lu and Ruekert, 
1999). In line with signaling theory, all of these can serve as signals as they have the following 
features, namely, they are differentially costly to obtain for ventures of different quality, are 
based on distinctive, observable and alterable characteristics, and are irreversible in the short-
term (Janney and Folta, 2003; Ozcan and Overby, 2008; Spence, 1973).  
Following the prior literature (e.g., Certo, Daily, and Dalton, 2001; Rao, Chandy and 
Prabhu, 2008), two categories of signal used by entrepreneurial firms entering into NPD alliances 
can be identified: internal signals, including historical, scientific, market, and locational aspects 
of the firm, and external signals, including alliances and partners (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Park 
and Mezias, 2005).  
The most readily available signals are arguably historical ones. Historical signals convey 
information about the entrepreneurial firm’s past performance and technological capability and, 
by inference, its future prospects. For example, the literature on technological path dependencies 
suggests that past technology may lock a firm in or out of certain technological trajectories (e.g., 
Dosi, 1988; Schilling, 1998). In a similar vein, Helfat and Raubitschek (2000) argue that a firm’s 
product history limits its choices for future product structures. When the firm forms an NPD 
alliance, its past technologies and products signal the alliance’s (and its products’) chances of 
success. Therefore, historical signals, such as past performance, quality of patents, which 
pharmaceutical firms use to appraise the prospects of biotechnology firms (Rothaermel, 2002), 
and prior NPD project suspensions and failures, gain a new meaning for investors when the 
entrepreneurial firm announces a new co-development alliance. These are important signals of 
the future value of the entrepreneurial firms.  
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Other internal signals include scientific, market, and locational signals. Scientific signals 
convey information that the entrepreneurial firm has the scientific knowledge and capability 
needed to operate in the industry successfully. An entrepreneurial firm may send this signal by, 
for example, recruiting eminent scientists to serve on its board (Certo, Daily, and Dalton, 2001).  
Market signals may convey information that the entrepreneurial firm has NPD projects 
targeting a particular sizable market, which has the potential to deliver value to its investors (Rao, 
Chandy and Prabhu, 2008).  
Finally, locational signals convey information that the firm may derive a differential 
advantage from its geographic location (Porter, 1998).  
External signals, meanwhile, include alliances and partners (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; 
Park and Mezias, 2005). NPD alliances have been argued to serve as signals of the quality of an 
entrepreneurial firm’s technology (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Pisano, 1990) and to legitimize 
the firm (Rao, Chandy and Prabhu, 2008). In addition, alliance partners are pathways for the 
exchange of resources and signals that convey recognition and legitimation to outsiders (Stuart, 
2000). 
Signaling environment  
Apart from their characteristics, the effectiveness of internal and external signals also 
depends on the environment in which the signals are received (Ilmola and Kuusi, 2006). This 
signaling environment can affect the extent to which signals reduce information asymmetry and 
how receivers notice and interpret the signals (Lester et al., 2006). In particular, during inter-
organizational signaling, one might expect different effects to arise from the influence of the task 
environment (Sanders and Boivie, 2004).  
As illustrated in Figure 1, in the context of co-development alliances in the 
pharmaceutical industry in particular, the signaling environment has a number of features which 
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may vary at different stages of the NPD process, including the major activities involved, the 
levels of investment, and related risks and failure rates. In the pharmaceutical industry, the NPD 
process is costly and has a long time frame and a low success rate. Taking a drug to market can 
involve a capitalized cost of over $800 million (DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski, 2003) and take 
more than 13 years (Kellogg and Charnes, 2000). These features affect how investors interpret 
the signals they receive from the entrepreneurial firms at different stages in the drug NPD process 
(Trope and Liberman, 2003).  
----Insert Figure 1 about here---- 
To describe the different stages of the NPD process for drugs, the prior literature has 
distinguished between the exploration and exploitation phases (e.g., Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2004). Co-development alliances formed at the initial, exploration stage focus on upstream 
activities in the value chain, such as basic research, drug discovery, and development. Alliances 
formed at later stages focus on exploitation, that is to say downstream activities, including 
clinical trials, regulatory processes, and launch. Within this second type of alliances, this study 
further distinguishes between alliances focusing on moderate-scale and large-scale downstream 
activities, where alliances focusing on Phases 1 and 2 clinical trials are classified as “moderate-
scale exploitation alliances” and those focusing on Phase 3 clinical trials, approval and launch are 
termed “large-scale exploitation alliances” (Urbig et al., 2013). This distinction is important 
because of the significant differences between these two types of exploitation in terms of the 
signaling environment, in which clinical trials are expensive, risky, and time-consuming (DiMasi, 
Hansen and Grabowski, 2003; Urbig et al., 2013). Overall, 58.6% of R&D expenditures for 
developing a new drug are spent on clinical trials, which may last for an average of six to seven 
years (PhRMA, 2010). Yet, there is significant difference between moderate-scale versus large-
scale of clinical trials in terms of their different scales and failure rates. Specifically, moderate-
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scale clinical trials have a small to moderate number of patients (i.e. often less than 100); average 
expenditure on moderate-scale Phase 1 clinical trials is around $57 million. However, the figures 
can jump up to thousands of patients in many different hospitals, and have been said to rise to 
$418 million for late Phase 3 clinical trials (Girotra, Terwiesch and Ulrick, 2007). While the 
accumulated probability of failure for preclinical and moderate-scale clinical stages is around 
80% (DiMasi, Hansen and Grabowski, 2003; Moran, 2003), for drugs that have entered the late 
Phase 3 clinical stage, this figure comes down to just 20 - 40% (Himmelmann and Schiereck, 
2009; Kellogg and Charnes, 2000). 
The question now is how do the above-summarized features of the signaling environment 
impact the signals investors receive from entrepreneurial firms when they form new co-
development alliances?  
Given the lengthy time frame of the NPD process for drugs, the way in which investors’ 
interpretation of the signals given depends on the drug development stage at which an alliance is 
formed can be explained by construal theory (Trope and Liberman, 2003). Construal theory 
predicts that whether events or actions are viewed in more abstract or more concrete terms 
depends on how distant they are. To quote Trope and Liberman (2003), “temporal distance 
changes people’s responses to future events by changing the way people mentally represent those 
events” (p. 403) and “distant future situations are construed on a higher level (i.e., using more 
abstract and central features) than near future situations” (Liberman and Trope, 1998: p. 5). Here, 
high-level construal of actions, or how investors interpret events or signals, includes the desirable 
outcomes, such as the end value that would result from a new alliance. Low-level construal of 
events or signals focuses on the feasibility of the desired outcome, which refers to “the ease or 
difficulty of reaching the end state” (Trope and Liberman, 2003: p. 410). For example, for people 
looking for a job, “desirability concerns the value of receiving a job offer, whereas feasibility 
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concerns the amount of time and effort one has to invest to get the job offer” (Trope and 
Liberman, 2003: p. 410). Construal theory thus suggests that feasibility matters more for near-
future judgments and preferences, such that the “probability dimension becomes more salient as 
time passes” (Öncüler, 2010: p. 113; Trope and Liberman, 2003). In near-future decisions, people 
tend to underutilize high-level (desirability) information, whereas in distant-future decisions they 
tend to underutilize low-level (feasibility) information (Trope and Liberman, 2003).  
Thus, construal theory provides a number of insights into drug discovery. When 
interpreting signals of a firm pursuing an NPD alliance at a downstream development stage, 
including moderate-scale and large-scale exploitation alliances, investors are likely to emphasize 
the firm’s ability to finalize the project successfully and the feasibility of this happening. 
Investors’ perception will change if such feasibility changes. Hence, the large-scale exploitation 
stage context is one in which feasibility is higher. In contrast, when judging NPD alliances at the 
upstream development stage of exploration, investors are less likely to focus on the feasibility of 
NPD success because the finalization of the development process and the product’s market 
introduction are distant in time. Instead, they will focus more on the desirability of NPD success, 
which concerns the value of a successful new product launch. In fact, distant-future predictions 
may be made with greater over-confidence than near-future predictions (Trope and Liberman, 
2003). This tendency is captured by the behavior of future optimism, where people tend to hold 
more positive expectancies for distant than near-future outcomes (Mitchell et al., 1997; Trope and 
Liberman, 2003).    
Figure 2 summarizes these arguments. The following section elaborates on the 
relationships in Figure 2 by describing effects from the historical signals of prior project 
suspensions and failures on value creation and their respective contingent effects in different 
signaling environments.   
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----Insert Figure 2 about here---- 
 
Hypotheses  
Prior NPD project suspensions as signals 
As discussed above, a project may be suspended because of timing issues and constraints 
affecting financial, technological, knowledge-related, and other resources. The suspended project 
passes a screening gate, however, once the resource and timing issues have been resolved, it can 
be reactivated (Cooper, 2003; Cooper and Edgett, 2012; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1990). An 
NPD alliance is one way to resolve these issues as alliance partners can provide the knowledge, 
technologies, financing and commercialization expertise needed to reactivate the suspended 
project at the right time (Ahuja, Lampert, and Tandon, 2008; Barney, 1991; Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Deeds and Hill, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Wernerfelt, 1984). Thus, project 
suspensions may signal to outsiders that the focal firm has robust, marketable ideas on which it 
cannot capitalize at the time when the project is suspended. 
In addition, during the creation of an alliance, the partners tend to conduct a very careful 
assessment of the entrepreneurial firm, evaluating its characteristics and the signals of the 
likelihood of the alliance’s success. In technology- and science-intensive industries such as 
biotechnology, prior project suspensions may signal that the firm’s NPD portfolio management 
involved a rigorous decision-making process. In particular, the temporary character of 
suspensions suggests that the management has decided to give priority to other projects (Cooper 
and Edgett, 2012), conveying to the partners and investors that the firm does indeed have good, 
marketable ideas to offer, and that it is competent in NPD management (Kester, Hultink and 
Griffin, 2014).  
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Finally, as discussed earlier, project suspensions are not failures. For an entrepreneurial 
firm, entering into an alliance may be interpreted by investors as a positive signal that alliances 
may bring the needed complementary resources for an idea to be made viable (Brown, 1997) and 
reactivate suspended projects at the right moment for the entrepreneurial firm.  
In sum, prior project suspensions signal to investors that the entrepreneurial firm has good 
ideas that may be activated in a new co-development alliance, and displays positive NPD 
management abilities. This will lead to higher positive abnormal returns when entrepreneurial 
firms with prior suspended projects announce the formation of a new co-development alliance. 
Formally: 
H1: The prior NPD project suspensions of an entrepreneurial firm have a positive effect 
on its abnormal returns when it forms a new co-development alliance. 
 
Prior NPD project failures as signals  
The technology literature has suggested that firms’ technological trajectories are path-
dependent (Dosi, 1982). Prior failures may signal declines in future commercial capabilities by 
reducing desorptive capabilities (Hu, McNamara and McLoughlin, 2015) and a weakening of 
future market-oriented innovations (Su and McNamara, 2012). Consequently, the firm’s past 
project failures may signal issues in current technology portfolios that decrease attractiveness and 
increase costs for prospective alliance partners, which in turn is a negative signal to investors 
about the value a new alliance formation may create.  
Prior project failures may also raise doubts about an entrepreneurial firm’s ability to learn 
from them (Shepherd and Cardon, 2009). Learning from failure is critically important to improve 
future performance, but it is one of the most difficult tasks that an organization performs 
(Wheelwright and Clark, 1992), in particular because of the negative impact of project failure on 
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individual learning behaviors and psychological well-being (Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd, Covin, 
and Kuratko 2009). Hence, an increasing number of prior project failures may signal the firm’s 
difficulties in learning from failure and an increased likelihood of making mistakes in the future.  
Finally, prior project failures decrease the bargaining power of the entrepreneurial firm 
vis-à-vis its alliance partners. In a typical bargaining situation in alliances, the more critical the 
resources and skills from the partner’s perspective, the greater the firm’s bargaining power 
(Makhija and Ganesh, 1997). In high-technology settings, large downstream firms seek NPD 
partnerships with smaller upstream firms because the latter have intangible resources and unique 
technological capabilities in niche areas (Chen and Hambrick, 1995; Stuart, 2000). However, if 
an entrepreneurial firm has a high failure rate where NPD projects are concerned, its bargaining 
power will decrease and may signal to investors that the entrepreneurial firm’s alliance partner 
may be in a better position to extract value from the new alliance than the firm itself, implying a 
lower potential value creation by the firm and hence lower abnormal returns when the formation 
of a new alliance announced.   
In sum, for an entrepreneurial firm, its prior NPD failures signal technological, learning-
related, and bargaining-power issues for a new co-development alliance, and these decrease its 
value-creation potential. These arguments are consistent with prior research in the area of finance 
which has evidenced negative abnormal returns upon clinical failure announcements by 
biopharmaceutical firms (Girotra, Terwiesch and Ulrick, 2007). There is also evidence of a 
negative bias towards NPD failure announcements with stock market declines in response to 
them being many times greater than the positive response to announcements of success in NPD 
(Sharma and Lacey, 2004). Taking these arguments together, this research predicts that: 
 H2: The prior NPD project failures of an entrepreneurial firm have a negative effect on its 
abnormal returns when it announces the formation of a new co-development alliance. 
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Signaling environment: the contingent effects of prior NPD project suspensions and failures 
H1 has predicted that higher levels of prior NPD project suspensions on the part of an 
entrepreneurial firm are positively associated with abnormal returns realized when the firm 
announced the formation of a new co-development alliance. In what follows, this research 
discusses how the strength of this effect depends on the changes in the signaling environment, 
that is to say the different stages along the exploration-exploitation continuum of the NPD 
process at which alliances are formed. 
 According to construal theory (Trope and Liberman, 2003), when judging NPD alliance 
in upstream development stages of exploration, investors are less likely to focus on the feasibility 
of NPD success because the finalization of the development process and the product’s market 
introduction are distant in time. Instead, investors will focus on the desirability of NPD success.  
As a result, they will have more optimistic expectations of an alliance which is in the exploration 
stage than an alliance in a later stage (cf. Mitchell et al., 1997; Trope and Liberman, 2003). This 
will make them view all signals sent by the entrepreneurial firms, such as signals of marketable 
ideas and NPD management abilities inferred from prior project suspensions, in a more positive 
light. In this sense, the positive signaling effect of prior NPD project suspensions on abnormal 
returns when a new NPD alliance is formed, as predicted in H1, may be stronger when the 
alliance concerns NPD in the exploration stage than in the exploitation stage.  
Compared to exploration alliances, exploitation alliances are less distant in time from the 
product launch. Hence, for exploitation alliances, the feasibility aspect of successful product 
launch becomes more prominent than the desirability aspect (Öncüler, 2010). As discussed 
earlier, the feasibility of NPD success varies significantly between moderate-scale and large-scale 
exploitations, with a considerably higher failure rate of just below 80% for moderate-scale 
exploitation (DiMasi, Hansen and Grabowski, 2003; Moran, 2003) compared to the 20% to 40% 
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failure rate of large-scale exploitation (Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Kellogg and Charnes, 
2000). As a result, investors’ value-creation expectations will be comparatively low for 
moderate-scale exploitation alliances because of the very high failure rate at this stage, and 
improved for large-scale exploitation alliances because the NPD success rate improves 
significantly towards the end of the process.  
This implies a significant shift in the signaling environment between the moderate-scale 
and large-scale exploitation stages of the NPD process, with investors having increasingly 
positive expectations as the feasibility of success (and their desire to focus on it) increases. 
Hence, the positive signaling effect of prior project suspensions on abnormal returns predicted in 
H1 will be weaker for co-development alliances engaged in moderate-scale exploitation than for 
those undertaking large-scale exploitation. Whether there is a significant difference between the 
signaling effects of prior project suspensions in exploration alliances (when investors focus on 
the desirability of success and have optimistic expectations) versus large-scale exploitation 
alliances (when investors focus on the moderate probability of success at 60-80%) cannot be 
determined on a theoretical level.  
Combining the above arguments this research predicts that the signaling environment of 
exploration alliances and large-scale exploitation alliances will be more positive than that of 
moderate-scale exploitation alliances. Formally:  
H3: For an entrepreneurial firm, the positive effect of its prior experience of NPD project 
suspensions on abnormal returns when a new co-development alliance is formed is stronger for 
alliances of exploration and large-scale exploitation than for alliances of moderate-scale 
exploitation. 
Let us now turn to the contingent signaling effect of prior NPD project failures. H2 has 
predicted that the prior NPD project failures of an entrepreneurial firm are negatively associated 
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with its abnormal returns when new co-development alliances are formed. Following the 
signaling and construal theories, on the basis of which this research expects the signaling 
environment to be less positive for moderate-scale exploitation alliances than for exploration and 
large-scale exploitation alliances, this research further predicts that the negative effect of prior 
NPD project failures is more pronounced in the case of the former than the latter. 
When evaluating an entrepreneurial firm with a high level of prior NPD failures in the 
exploration stage of a co-development alliance, investors tend to be optimistic (as discussed 
earlier) and are therefore likely to make insufficient efforts to garner information about the firm’s 
NPD abilities and feasibility to successfully complete the NPD process in the future. For some, 
negative signals such as prior project failures are deliberately ignored (Öncüler, 2010; Trope and 
Liberman, 2003). As a result of this optimism, when evaluating firms in exploration alliances, 
investors will tend to focus on how they can recover from prior NPD failures and on the 
desirability of possible NPD success (Mitchell et al., 1997; Trope and Liberman, 2003). All these 
factors contribute to the weaker negative signaling effect of prior project failures for exploration 
alliances in the upstream of NPD as compared to exploitation alliances. 
For exploitation alliances, as discussed earlier, the feasibility of NPD success becomes 
more salient (Öncüler, 2010), increasing from 20% for moderate-scale exploitation alliances to 
60-80% for large-scale exploitation alliances (DiMasi, Hansen and Grabowski, 2003; 
Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Kellogg and Charnes, 2000; Moran, 2003). For large-scale 
exploitation co-development in particular, the NPD process outcomes become more predictable, 
with the prime focus on exploitative searches for knowledge appropriation, such as developing 
specific applications or making minor improvements and alterations to current products (Lee, 
2011). This may lead to a weaker negative signaling effect on the part of prior NPD project 
failures in large-scale exploitation alliances than in moderate-scale exploitation alliances.  
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Therefore, this research predicts that: 
 H4: The negative effect of an entrepreneurial firm’s prior NPD project failures on 
abnormal returns when new co-development alliances are formed is stronger in the cases of 
alliances of moderate-scale exploitation than alliances of exploration and large-scale 
exploitation.    
 
Methodology  
Data, sample, and event study 
The empirical setting of this study is the biopharmaceutical industry. Data for this study 
was obtained from industry-specific databases that monitor the alliance and NPD project 
activities of biopharmaceutical firms, namely Biocentury Archives, Biocentury Financial Center, 
BioScan and Pharmaprojects. Additional information about alliances was obtained from the news 
database Lexis-Nexis, while financial data was obtained from GlobalVantage (accounting data on 
European firms), Compustat (accounting data on US firms), and DataStream (stock prices and 
market indices).   
The initial sample was the complete set of firms active in the discovery and development 
of novel drug compounds for human therapeutics between 1996 and 2003 that were listed on 
eight stock exchanges in the USA and Europe. The choice of sample period was dictated by data 
availability. The researchers were interested in small and medium-sized entrepreneurial firms and 
thus excluded all large biopharmaceutical firms with a market capitalization above US $3 billion 
in 2002. This filter reflects the unique distribution of firms by capitalization in this industry 
(Rasmussen, 2010). Recent research has found that a small number of large biopharmaceutical 
companies dominate the industry. There are an estimated 3,500 bio-pharmaceutical firms 
globally, of which about 15% are public companies. The vast majority of these firms are small, 
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with the majority of listed ones having a market capitalization of less than $250 million 
(Rasmussen, 2010). Therefore, the filter of $3 billion has the advantage of being able to capture 
all the small and medium-sized entrepreneurial firms listed in the US and Europe, and at the same 
time to screen the very large firms out of the sample (e.g., large biotech firms such as Amgen 
were therefore excluded). The resulting sample is a representative of all the small and medium-
sized entrepreneurial firms listed in the US and Europe. 
In addition, the filter of $3 billion leads to a sample comparable to a recent study on small 
firms by Yang, Zheng, and Zhao (2014). More detailed comparison with this and other studies is 
provided in Table 1. While the choice of public companies required for the use of the event study 
methodology provides methodological advantages (Boyd, Chandy and Cunha Jr, 2010; Lee and 
Chen, 2009; Swaminathan and Moorman, 2009), the authors acknowledge the limitations of the 
data, one of which is that this research has no observations on private firms. The simple 
comparison of key sample characteristics of different studies provided in Table 1 shows that the 
average size and age of this study’s sample firms is not unlike those used in other studies. Some 
examples of the sample entrepreneurial firms and their partners are provided in Table 2.  
----Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here---- 
The filter generated a sample of 126 entrepreneurial firms, which made 2453 alliance 
announcements. The research purpose was to understand the signaling effects of new bi-party co-
development alliances and so this research eliminated any multi-party alliances and follow-up 
agreements or contract extensions. Following good practice, all announcements confounded with 
other value-relevant news in a window of +/- three days around the focal announcement date 
were identified and eliminated (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Examples of confounding events 
included the announcement of financial results, amongst others. This reduced the number of firms 
to 104 and the number of alliance announcements to 327. After accounting for missing data, the 
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final sample used for hypotheses testing included 248 observations. Statistical analyses were 
conducted to check if there was any issue with the missing data. First, a t-test was used 
comparing the mean of all the key variables between the missing and non-missing groups. The 
results were not significant. Second, a logistic regression was used predicting missing data points 
(0 = not missing, 1 = missing) from all the key variables, and none of them were significant. 
These results suggest that missing data is not an issue.  
 
Dependent variable 
The event study method identifies abnormal movement in a firm’s stock price (i.e., 
abnormal returns) on the day the firm announces the formation of an alliance. Abnormal returns 
are used as proxy for value creation as a result of the new alliance and are therefore appropriate 
for testing the predicted signaling effects and their contingencies. This research took the earliest 
alliance announcement date reported in Biocentury Archives, in Lexis-Nexis, or on the company’s 
website and used abnormal returns noted on this day (provided it was a trading day) as the 
dependent variable. Following Boyd, Chandy and Cunha Jr (2010), the market model of the event 
study method was used to define the event of interest as k and the event announcement day as t, 
and the rate of return on the stock price of firm i on day t was estimated according to the 
following formula:  
(1) Rit = ai + biRmt + eit, 
in which Rit represents the rate of return on the stock price of firm i on day t; Rmt represents the 
corresponding daily returns using the index of the local stock market on day t, including the 
Nasdaq Composite Index in the US, the FTAllshare in the UK, and, for European-listed firms the 
composite or best available market index for that stock exchange; ai indicates the intercept term; 
bi represents the systematic risk of stock i; and eit stands for the residual of the estimation.  
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Next, abnormal returns (ARit) for each firm were estimated using the following equation: 
(2) eit = ARit = Rit – (ai + biRmt), 
from which the researchers obtained the ordinary least squares parameter estimates by running 
regressions of Rit on Rmt over a period of 250 days before the event k (Boyd, Chandy and Cunha 
Jr, 2010).  
Thus, in generating the abnormal returns dependent variable, this research employed the 
event study method taking into account the multi-country setting of this study (Park, 2004), 
eliminating observations with confounding events (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), and avoiding 
the use of a single expected-returns model (Chatterjee et al., 1999). This methodology was 
adopted from the finance literature and corporate governance studies (McConnell and Nantell, 
1985). It has been employed extensively to study alliances (Gulati, Lavie and Singh, 2009), and 
in innovation and marketing research (Boyd, Chandy and Cunha Jr, 2010; Lee and Chen, 2009; 
Swaminathan and Moorman, 2009).   
Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations and T-statistics for abnormal returns on 
each of the trading days from t = -5 to t = 5 (N = 248). Except for the day 0, no other day’s 
abnormal returns differed from 0 significantly. The results indicate the accuracy of the date of the 
first public announcement of alliance this research identified. Thanks to this accuracy, gains from 
alliance formation for the entrepreneurial firms measured in this study are not only significant but 
also higher than some of the previous findings. Some of the reasons for these higher returns 
include the focus on smaller firms than many studies (Chang and Chen, 2002; Das, Sen, and 
Sengupta, 1998; Lee and Wyatt, 1990; Reuer and Koza, 2000) and the choice of R&D intensive 
firms.  
----Insert Table 3 about here---- 
 
Page 27 of 61 Journal of Product Innovation Management
  28 
Independent variables 
Prior project suspensions. This variable is calculated as the accumulated number of all 
prior NPD project suspensions on the part of the entrepreneurial firm from 1990 until the day 
prior to the focal alliance announcement (obtained from the Pharmaprojects database). As an 
alternative, this variable was also measured as the ratio of the total number of suspended projects 
to the total number of all the drug development initiatives in the focal firm in the period from 
1990 to the year prior to the given event year. The results are consistent.  
Prior project failures. This variable is calculated as the total number of a focal firm’s 
ceased drug development initiatives from 1990 until the day prior to the recent alliance 
announcement. This variable was also measured as the ratio of the total number of ceased drug 
development initiatives to the total number of all the drug development initiatives in a focal firm 
in the period from 1990 to the year prior to the given event year (data from Pharmaprojects). The 
results are consistent. 
Exploration, moderate-scale and large-scale exploitation alliances dummy variables. The 
three phases of the drug development process were captured using dummy variables. Following 
previous research (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2008; Urbig et al., 2013), exploration alliances were 
defined as ones that focus on upstream NPD activities (i.e., basic research, drug discovery, and 
development), moderate-scale exploitation alliances as ones that focus on moderate-scale 
downstream NPD activities (Phase 1 and 2 clinical trials), and large-scale exploitation alliances 
as those focusing on large-scale downstream NPD activities (including Phase 3 clinical trials, the 
regulatory process, and marketing and sales; see Figure 1).  
Control variables 
Following the conceptual framework (Figure 2), in terms of internal signals, this research 
controlled for two historical signals studied in prior literature: past performance and technology 
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quality. Scientific, market, and locational signals were also included as control variables. In terms 
of external signals, controls for potential milestone, partner reputation, and partner failures were 
included.  
Past performance. A firm’s previous performance may influence how investors evaluate 
the shareholder value of its current event announcement (Robertson, Eliashberg and Rymon, 
1995). In keeping with prior literature (Lee and Chen, 2009), past performance was measured 
using lagged Tobin’s q.  
Technology quality. One important way for pharmaceutical firms to appraise the prospects 
of biotechnology firms is by evaluating their patent portfolios (Rothaermel, 2002). Prior literature 
used the number of citations that a patent receives as a proxy for the value of patents (Fleming 
and Sorenson, 2001). This research therefore used the natural logarithm of cumulative patent 
citations to measure the quality of the firm’s technology prior to the alliance announcement.  
Scientific signal. This variable was measured as the number of academics on the board of 
the entrepreneurial firm (Rao, Chandy, and Prabhu, 2008). The data sources for this were 
LexisNexis and SEC filings. 
Market signal. This variable was measured as the estimated market size of the therapeutic 
category and signals the market potential of the drug which is the subject of the new alliance. 
This data came from Pharmaproject.  
Locational signal. This is a dummy variable indicating the geographical location of the 
firm. It is equal to 1 for a European firm and 0 for a US-based firm. This data came from 
company websites. 
Own potential milestone. In co-development alliances, one alliance partner may provide 
financial payments to another contingent on passing a given development milestone. At the time 
of the formation of the alliance, the financial value of these milestone payments is often disclosed 
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to the market. This amount of money represents the total that would be paid if all developmental 
milestones were met, however these are stretching targets and few projects actually achieve all 
milestones. These milestone payments are informative for investors in that they demonstrate part 
of the value that the partner sees in the project if it were fully successful and the amount of funds 
that are available to support the costs of NPD. This data came from Biocentury Archives, 
Biocentury Financial Center, BioScan and Pharmaprojects and is used in logged form in the 
regression analysis.  
Partner reputation. Following prior literature (Hitt et al., 2000; Stuart, 2000), a partner 
dummy was included to model a partner’s reputation and experiences in NPD. Specifically, the 
partner dummy is equal to 1 if an alliance partner was listed among the top 20 companies in the 
biopharmaceutical industry in terms of the number of R&D clinical trials originated and in-
licensed by a firm in the year of the focal alliance announcement; otherwise, the variable equals 
0. This variable was obtained from Pharmaprojects and updated yearly. 
Partner project failures. Partner firms’ failures were measured as the ratio of the total 
number of ceased drug development initiatives to the total number of all the drug development 
initiatives in a partner firm in the period from 1990 to the year prior to the given event year (data 
from Pharmaprojects). As an alternative, this variable was also measured as a count variable, and 
the results remained unchanged. Since a partner with a larger number of NPD projects tends to 
experience higher number of failures (other things being equal), the count variable may control 
for the partner’s R & D scale to some extent.     
Besides controlling for signaling effects not focal to this study, other factors that may 
have an impact on abnormal returns and have been used in prior literatures were also included. 
These are as follows. 
Firm age. Number of calendar years after the establishment of the firm.  
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Firm size. Lagged employee count divided by 1000.    
R&D scale. Lagged amount of R&D expenditure divided by 1 million.  
Financial slack. Equity-to-debt ratio, i.e., (total assets ˗ total liabilities)/total liabilities, 
was used to measure this variable. This ratio indicates a firm’s unused borrowing capacity 
(Cheng and Kesner, 1997), which captures the concept of unabsorbed slack. The extant literature 
suggests that budgetary slack causes the relaxation of controls, thereby allowing more autonomy 
in project teams (Nohria and Gulati, 1996), and possibly leading to better NPD outcomes 
(Bourgeois, 1981). 
Alliance experience. Prior literature has suggested that alliance experience is an important 
determinant of abnormal returns to strategic alliances in general (Anand and Khanna, 2000; 
Sampson, 2005). Alliance experience was measured as a one-year lagged and logged count of all 
alliances the focal firm had prior to the focal alliance, starting from 1990 or the year of the firm’s 
establishment, whichever was later. Data was obtained from company alliance portfolios listed on 
an annual basis in BioScan and Pharmaprojects, supplemented with alliances identified through 
Lexis-Nexis.  
Analysis  
To test the hypotheses, all independent and control variables were regressed upon the 
abnormal returns using White’s covariance matrix estimator to control for potential 
heteroskedasticity, with an additional adjustment for within-group dependence of observations in 
the sample per firm (the ‘cluster’ procedure; StataCorp, 2007). This accounted for firm-specific 
effects. All continuous independent variables were winsorized at the 2.5% level and mean-
centered. Winsorization eliminates the potential effects of outliers by replacing extreme values in 
each variable with the next respective value, counting inwards from the extremes (Ortiz-Molina, 
2006). Mean-centering prevents the occurrence of collinearity problems and facilitates the 
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interpretation of the estimation results where multiplicative terms are used (Aiken and West, 
1991). A variance inflation factor (VIF) test found that the average VIF value was 2.4 with all of 
the VIF values well below the critical value of 10, indicating that collinearity is unlikely to be an 
issue in the models. To avoid potential multicolinearity and following prior research (e.g., Stuart, 
Hoang and Hybels, 1999), the interaction effects were introduced in separate models. The full 
model was also included.   
 
Results 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrices for the variables used 
in the study. From Table 4, it is evident that there is considerable variance in abnormal returns 
and focal independent variables in this study. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient between 
prior project suspensions and project failures (0.20) indicates consistency with the idea that these 
can function as different signals. 
---- Insert Table 4 about here ---- 
Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis with robust errors. Models 0–5 
reveal that control variables produced mostly insignificant effects on abnormal returns. This is 
similar to some prior research that found no support for the effects of firm size (Anand and 
Khanna, 2000) on abnormal returns following alliance announcements. There are some notable 
observations for the control variables. First, the partner dummy variable is always significantly 
positive, suggesting that allying with top-20 companies in the biopharmaceutical industry 
increases abnormal returns. This effect is not surprising, considering the insights from many prior 
alliance studies on entrepreneurial firms (Stuart et al., 1999; Stuart, 2000). Second, the signs of 
past performance are always positive, which is in line with the literature on path dependence and 
the conceptualization of historical signals in this study. Third, the alliance experience variable is 
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always negative. This is consistent with the patterns reflected in the findings of Gulati et al. 
(2009), suggesting that general alliance experience does not contribute positively to abnormal 
returns. This result also alludes to the difficulty of learning from alliance experience.  
----Insert Table 5 about here---- 
In Model 1, the main effect of prior project suspensions was included. The result is 
positive and significant (β = 0.023, p<0.05). The result supports H1, which predicted that prior 
suspended projects are positive signals about the entrepreneurial firm’s potential to create value 
from a new alliance.  
H2 predicted that prior project failures would have a negative signaling effect on abnormal 
returns. In line with this hypothesis, in Model 2, the prior project failures variable is significant 
and negative (β = -0.195, p<0.01). Models 3-5 render further support to the hypothesis.     
Models 3 and 4 introduce interaction effects to test H3 and H4. Moderate-scale exploitation 
alliances are always used as the reference group. Specifically, in Model 3, the first interaction 
effects of interest were entered: how the NPD stage at which the alliances are formed (i.e., 
exploration and moderate and large-scale exploitation) moderates the positive effect of suspended 
projects. According to H3, the positive effect of prior project suspensions on abnormal returns is 
stronger for alliances of explorations and large-scale exploitations than for alliances of moderate-
scale exploitations. The positive and significant result of the interaction term between “prior 
project suspensions” and “exploration alliance dummy” (β = 0.029, p<0.01), and the positive but 
insignificant result of interaction term between “prior project suspensions” and “large-scale 
exploitation alliance dummy” (β = 0.044, p=0.31) partially support this hypothesis. While the 
positive sign with the large-scale exploitation alliance is in line with the hypothesis, its 
insignificance is worthy of further explanation. One possible reason for it could be that investors 
pay less attention to the signal from the prior project suspensions of the entrepreneurial firm, but 
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more attention to the failure signal from the partner firms within a large-scale exploitation 
alliance. In Model 5, the significant interaction term between partner failures and a large-scale 
exploitation alliance (β = 0.589, p<0.05) indicates that this is a possibility, suggesting a 
noteworthy effect from the failure signal of partner firms during a large-scale exploitation 
alliance.  
Model 4 tested how the negative effect of prior failures is moderated by the NPD stage at 
which alliances are formed. According to H4, this relationship is more pronounced for moderate-
scale exploitation alliances than for exploration and large-scale exploitation alliances. The 
positive sign of the interaction term between “prior project failures” and “exploration alliance 
dummy” from Model 4 (β = 0.253, p<0.100) and the insignificant results of interaction term 
between “prior project failure” and “large-scale exploitation alliance dummy” (β = -0.132, 
p=0.574) partially support this hypothesis. The negative sign of the latter interaction term is 
intriguing. One possible explanation could be discerned in the observations that prior failures are 
associated with rising operational costs (Baum and Dahlin, 2007), which is a big concern at the 
exploitation stage, where investment in large-scale clinical trials are much higher than at 
moderate-scale stages. The perceptions of such increased cost might have led to a less favorable 
perception of the “feasibility” of prior project failures, suggesting higher investment to reach 
final launch. The other possible explanation could come from the finance literature, which has 
demonstrated a bias against failure in the financial markets. At the large-scale exploitation stage, 
investors can be very sensitive to past failures and may therefore react negatively.  
Model 5 is the full model. The results are consistent with the major findings of the partial 
Models 1 to 4, and support the hypotheses.  
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Robustness checks and additional analyses 
To test the robustness of the results, a number of additional analyses were performed to 
address the following questions.  
How do prior project suspensions and failures influence actual successful NPD launches?  
The analyses show that prior project suspensions increase the value-creation potential of 
new co-development alliances, while prior failures decrease it. However, it is not clear how prior 
suspensions and failures affect actual product development rather than the instant effect of the 
stock market response. The answers to such questions could generate new insights. Therefore, 
two additional analyses were conducted as follows. First was a regression model using successful 
product launches as the dependent variable, and one-year lagged prior project suspensions and 
prior project failures as independent variables, together with the other control variables included 
in the models in Table 5. The results in Table 6 suggest that prior project suspensions have a 
significantly positive effect on actual product launches, while prior project failures have a 
negative one. Next, a logistic model with prior project suspensions and failures was used to 
predict success in product launches. Again the results (not shown here to save space) confirm that 
prior project suspensions can effectively predict successful product launch.  
---- Insert Table 6 about here ---- 
How are the empirical measures of suspensions and failures consistent with the 
conceptualization? 
The two variables of project suspensions and project failures are conceptually distinct. 
For example, project suspensions should be temporary in nature, and long-term suspensions 
could be seen as failures. Empirically, it is necessary to know more about the differences between 
the failure and suspension measures in the context of NPD in the biopharmaceutical industry. In 
order to address these issues, further analyses were conducted.  
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This study used data on project suspensions and failures from the Pharmaprojects 
database. Pharmaprojects scans relevant publications and contacts companies directly to keep 
track of the drug development activity in the industry. According to its manual, project 
suspension is defined as project “development suspended with the possibility of restarting,” while 
project failure is defined as “development terminated.”  In addition to the two types of status of 
NPD projects, Pharmaprojects also records a third type, namely “no development reported,” 
meaning “no evidence of continuing development reported.” A product profile is designated as 
“no development reported” when no new information or evidence of continuing development has 
been found for a period of around 12 to 18 months. This label remains until active development 
resumes or the company confirms that the drug has been discontinued or terminated.  
By this definition, no project can be designated in the database as “suspended” longer 
than 12 to 18 months. If a suspension lasts for over 18 months, it will be labeled as “no 
development reported,” and in this case the length of suspensions should be smaller than or at 
most equal to the “no development reported” period. Thus, project suspensions in the data are 
temporary in nature. As illustrated in Figure 3, a distinctive pattern emerges for the time period of 
the three types of project status: namely suspensions, failures and no development reported.  
---- Insert Figure 3 about here---- 
 The number of months from start to final termination of a failed project is considerably 
larger than the maximum number of months for which a project can retain the status of “no 
development reported.” Since the duration of a project suspension is smaller than or at the most 
equal to the maximum number of months for which a project can be labeled as “no development 
reported,” from the comparison in Figure 3, one can conclude that the duration of project 
suspensions is much shorter than the life span of a failed project.   
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In addition, a failure may be dressed up as a suspension when firms with higher failure 
rates intentionally send false signals (Johnstone and Grafen, 1993). It is also necessary to have a 
better understanding of the degree to which there is an overlap between suspensions and failures. 
To probe this possibility, the researchers conducted a logistic regression, using project failure 
rates (i.e., the ratio of the total number of ceased drug development initiatives to the total number 
of all the drug development initiatives) in a focal firm to predict the likelihood of project 
suspensions while controlling for the other control variables included in Table 5. The results 
indicate that project failure rates do not predict project suspensions, suggesting that firms with 
higher failure rates would not be more likely to intentionally report failures as suspensions.  
Beyond the analyses addressing the above questions, a number of other analyses were 
conducted. First was a test for potential selection bias, because entrepreneurial firms’ valuations 
may be affected by unobserved factors that also influence entrepreneurial firms’ intentions to 
form alliances, causing an endogeneity problem. Therefore a conventional Heckman two-stage 
approach was performed. In the first stage the tendency of forming alliances with partner firms 
was regressed on firm size, age, past performance, R&D expenditure, and failure rate. It is 
assumed that entrepreneurial firms with a higher failure rate and fewer resources were under 
greater pressure to form alliances with large firms in order to access external resources 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). The test suggested that selection was not an issue for this 
study’s sample. 
Second, previous research suggests that organizations require a certain amount of 
experiences of failure before they can extract and effectively apply knowledge from others’ 
failures. Those with relatively little direct failure experience may misapply knowledge from their 
own successes and others’ failures. Therefore the potential non-linear relationship of the 
interaction effects was tested in an effort to identify the ideal failure rate (Barczak, 2014). These 
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models suffered from potential multicolinearity (VIF >10) as a result of the simultaneous 
inclusion of the higher-order variables as both main effects and interaction effects. Such potential 
multicollinearity may produce misleading results since it artificially inflates the p-values of the 
individual effects (Greene, 2002). Further tests of the potential non-linear relationship of project 
suspensions led to similar issues.  
Third was a check for any potential effects associated with the timing of alliance 
announcements over the industry life cycle. During the sample period, 1996-2003, the 
biopharmaceutical industry gained significantly in commercial and technological maturity. To 
account for this potential bias, calendar year dummies were included in each of the models. The 
substantive results remained unchanged. 
Fourth, alternative alliance dummies were used as the reference group in the interaction 
terms, the main results remained unchanged.  
Finally, a finer-grained categorization of the signaling environment capturing every stage 
of the NPD process was considered. However, there were missing data for some of the stages, 
which decreased the sample size, while these analyses required five additional variables as main 
effects, and 5×2=10 interaction effects. The results were consistent with the current analysis, but 
the models lacked degrees of freedom and hence are not reported here. 
 
Discussion 
Main results  
In many industries, including the pharmaceutical (Evans and Varaiya, 2003), 
telecommunications (Buganza, Dell’Era, and Verganti, 2009), software (Ethiraj et al., 2009), and 
electronics ones (Terwiesch, Loch, and Niederkofler, 1998), entrepreneurial firms often enter into 
co-development alliances in pursuit of commercial innovations with large firms and other 
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organizations. In these industries, failures and setbacks are an integral aspect of the NPD process. 
This article focused on the pharmaceutical industry, in which only one out of 5,000 drug 
candidates reaches market launch (Evans and Varaiya, 2003) and only 20% of drugs that make it 
to the market generate a financial return in excess of their cost of capital (Vernon, Golec, and 
DiMasi, 2010). Hence, research into the impact of prior project failures on the performance of 
subsequent NPD endeavors and how to improve this performance is critically important. Thus 
far, there has been limited research in this area. This is because failures are generally hidden both 
internally and from external parties as companies and individuals do not wish to admit them 
publicly nor take responsibility for them (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone, 1994; Smith-Doerr, 
Manev, and Rizova, 2004). Managers therefore speak asymmetrically about successes and 
failures. Only recently have scholars started to investigate how NPD failures affect firm 
performance and why some firms are affected by them differently than others (De Carolis et al, 
2009; Girotra, Terwiesch and Ulrich, 2007; Sarkar and De Jong, 2006; Urbig et al., 2013). This 
line of research, however, does not say much about project suspensions, either theoretically or 
empirically (Cooper and Edgett, 2012).  
In regulated NPD environments where regulators proactively test the efficacy of an 
innovation and halt the development of innovations that are dangerous, both NPD project 
suspensions and failures can be observed. As argued in this article, project suspensions and 
failures are both indicative of a firm’s inability to carry out a project to successful completion, 
but suspensions are distinct from failures in that, unlike failed projects, suspended ones (a) pass 
screening criteria and offer good investment potential and (b) can be reactivated once critical 
resource and timing issues have been resolved, for example when an alliance partner brings in the 
required expertise and financing.  
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Past innovation research has provided mixed findings regarding the relationship between 
project suspensions and failures and value creation. It has been argued that project suspensions in 
NPD may cause delays to the market, yet suspensions may also improve new product quality and 
the chances of success later on (McNally, Akdeniz and Calantone, 2011). Similarly, project 
failure may both improve and impede value creation. On the positive side, experience of failure 
has been shown to aid in organizational transformation (McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 1999), 
improve a firm’s adaptability to environmental changes, and develop organizational reliability 
(Carmeli and Schaubroeck, 2008). Failure experience may also improve the outcomes of 
subsequent exploratory R&D (Su and McNamara, 2012). However, prior failures are associated 
with rising operational costs (Baum and Dahlin, 2007) and are viewed negatively by peers 
(Edmondson, 2011). Therefore, more research into failure in innovation is needed (Barczak, 
2014), in particular to understand its main and contingent effects on subsequent value creation. 
In order to address this need, this article used signaling theory to delineate the positive 
effects of prior suspended projects and the negative effects of prior project failures on value 
creation by new co-development alliances. The findings provide new insights into the value of 
abandoned or shelved ideas and projects by shifting the focus away from temporal structuring 
mechanisms internal to a firm (Garud et al., 2011; Lokshin et al., 2011; Orlikowski and Yates, 
2002) and onto external mechanisms such as co-development alliances. The positive effect of 
project suspensions suggests that these may provide an opportunity for NPD teams to reflect on, 
articulate, and codify lessons learned from project experiences, and hence to improve future NPD 
project management (Shepherd, et al., 2014) and portfolio management; the latter has been rated 
as the weakest area of NPD (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1995; Kester, Hultink and Griffin, 2014).  
In this study, the researchers further considered the contingent effect of suspended 
projects and failures by differentiating between alliances formed at different stages of the NPD 
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process, namely exploration, moderate-scale exploitation, and large-scale exploitation. A 
particularly interesting finding is the contingent effect whereby exploration stages of the drug 
development process provide a positive context that enhances the positive impact of prior project 
suspensions and limits the negative impact of prior project failures on the value which investors 
attach to new co-development alliances. In contrast, moderate-scale exploitation stages of the 
drug development process provide a negative context. This has important implications for both 
theory and practice.  
Theoretical implications 
Regarding theory, the findings demonstrate the effect of the signaling context on 
developing new drugs and products more broadly (Connelly et al., 2011; Lester et al., 2006) and 
suggest that signaling effects are contingent not only on how far a product is in its development 
process but also on an individual’s (in this case, an investor’s) perceptions. This adds to the prior 
co-development literature, which has considered alliances that combine complementary resources 
as a value-creation mechanism without taking the contingencies of the NPD process into account 
(Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Gulati, Lavie and Singh, 2009; Yang, Zheng and Zhao, 2014). The 
insights deriving from construal theory indicate that the perceived value of prior and current 
projects – suspended, failed, and new co-development alliances – depends on the time (and 
psychological) distance from expected outcomes, such as new product launch. The further away a 
project is in time, the more individuals focus on the desirability of outcomes rather than their 
actual probability, and the more optimistic they become in their evaluations of these projects 
(Trope and Liberman, 2003). This creates a distorting effect, whereby exploration projects are 
viewed more positively than moderate-scale exploitation projects, even though considering the 
actual odds of success the opposite should be expected. Hence, future research may consider 
cognitive and psychological factors when analyzing the meaning and impact of signals (cf. Ozcan 
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and Overby, 2008), but also when studying suboptimal NPD decisions that may hinder learning, 
and decrease performance.  
Managerial implications 
Considering the high failure rate in NPD and the lack of prior research on the different 
setbacks which may occur, the results of this study offer managerial insights for NPD 
management practice, in particular for managers of high-technology firms. This study’s results 
will help them to better anticipate and understand the financial consequences of prior NPD 
project suspensions and failures. By understanding the differential impacts of suspensions and 
failures, managers can better analyze and assess past setbacks and failures and raise awareness 
about companies’ suspension and failure profiles in accordance with setback types, and how 
value can best be generated in alliances. The findings on the positive influence of prior NPD 
project suspensions may suggest that proactively managing the tasks of portfolio management, 
including de-prioritizing existing projects while allocating and re-allocating resources to active 
projects (Cooper et al., 1998, 2001; Griffin, 1997), can send out positive signals to investors that 
the firm has good potential resources and a sound management ability to create better value in 
NPD alliances. The findings from this research therefore help to shed light on the effective 
mechanisms for tolerating setbacks, and creating or preserving value in innovation (Barczak, 
2014).  
Furthermore, the results suggest that exploration alliances add more to the positive value 
created by suspensions (or do more to counter the damage caused by failures) than moderate-
scale exploitation alliances. In light of this particular finding, managers should be aware that 
signaling suspensions and failures to investors can influence their expectations and consequently 
impact shareholder value in the case of NPD alliance announcement. In particular, exploratory 
alliances seem to be an attractive stage at which to create or preserve value. Furthermore, the 
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high failure rate in NPD suggests the need for firms to develop a culture that tolerates a process 
of developing innovations without certainty of outcomes, patience in face of mounting losses, 
and willingness to accept failure (Tellis, 2012). For those firms planning to build a culture of 
tolerance towards failure, entering co-development alliances may be more desirable at 
exploratory stages than later on.  
In fact, exploration alliances can be conduits for organizational learning and co-creation 
of knowledge by partners where each party attempts to identify, transfer, and absorb part or all of 
the counterpart’s valuable knowledge assets (Lubatkin, Florin, and Lane, 2001). Clarity about 
these effects can help managers to create and manage collaborations by addressing the conditions 
under which firms can create and preserve value in alliances (Fang, Lee and Yang, 2015; Gulati, 
Lavie and Singh, 2009; Merchant and Schendel, 2000). Importantly, of course, managers must 
also consider whether such signaling measures that preserve firm value in the short run can lead 
to success in the long run. In particular, they need to be aware of the potential psychological and 
cognitive factors that may lead to NPD screening and investment decisions that are more 
optimistic than rational, as such effects may apply equally to both investors and decision makers. 
It would be interesting for future research to investigate such effects. 
 
Limitations and future research 
Like all studies, the present one has limitations that in turn provide opportunities for 
future research. First, this article examined different types of setback from the perspective of the 
NPD process. Other types of setback and the impact of the heterogeneity of failure experience 
should be looked at in future studies (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). For example, future 
research could look into the types of NPD failure in incremental innovations and radical 
innovations. In addition, research might look at other types of failure during NPD, such as 
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process failure (Shepherd, Covin, and Kuratko, 2009) and strategic failure (Lant and 
Montgomery, 1987). 
Second, this study focused only on biopharmaceutical companies, and thus on a single 
high-technology industry. While this sampling technique rules out methodological threats such as 
potential confounding effects (Zheng, Liu, and George, 2010), it raises the question of 
generalizability to a larger population. Caution must be exercised when transferring findings from 
a single industry to others, for example to an industry with shorter NPD cycles. It is hoped that 
future research will test whether this study’s findings are robust in settings other than the 
biopharmaceutical industry.  
Third, due to data limitations, this research could not find out what the ideal failure rate 
may be for the firms. Detailed data on project suspensions and failures at each and every stage of 
NPD may be helpful in this regard.  
Fourth, the event study method used in this study has its limitations, such as the inability 
to include private firms.  
Finally, this study provides only a snapshot of investors’ reactions to how alliance events 
are affected by project suspensions and failures of firms; a long-term view may provide 
additional valuable insights (Sood and Tellis, 2009).   
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Table 1. A comparison of the sample with those of prior studies 
Name of the study Sample Firm size Firm age 
Rothaermel and Deeds 
(2006) 
325 fully dedicated biotechnology firms 
that participated in 2,226 R&D alliances 
between 1973 and 1997, including public 
and private firms.  
 
161 9.6 
De Carolis, Yang, Deeds 
and Nelling (2009)  
57 public biotechnology companies in the 
USA and Canada (1992-2003). 
798 13.06 
Rao, Chandy, and 
Prabhu(2008) 
All public biotechnology firms with 93 
product introductions from 1982 to 2002 in 
the USA 
550 15.39 
Yang, Zheng and Zhao 
(2014) 
All small biotechnology firms founded 
between 1984 and 1992 that generated 
revenues lower than $100 million from 
1984 to 2006 in the USA. 
191 12.03 
Deeds and Hill (1996) 
All 132 firms engaged in biotechnology in 
the USA as of 1991 that were developing 
in vivo therapeutics or diagnostics 
(including public and private firms). 
N/A 7.69 
Our study sample  
126 public firms listed on eight stock 
exchanges in the US and Europe between 
1996 and 2003  
210 10 
Note: A simple analysis was conducted by comparing the key variables of this study’s sample 
with previous studies. Specifically, the size (measured by number of employees) and age of firms 
were compared, since these are the only data available across different studies. Although the 
comparison is rather indicative in nature, it shows that this study’s sample is similar in size and 
age to the samples included in the previous studies.  
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Table 2. A selection of entrepreneurial firms and their partners in the sample 
Firm  Partners 
Location of the 
firm 
Acambis Plc Novartis  United Kingdom 
Arqule Inc Bayer  USA 
Genset SA Abbott Laboratories France 
Karo Bio AB Abbott Laboratories Sweden 
Oxford Glycosciences Merck  United Kingdom 
Phytopharm Plc Pfizer  United Kingdom 
Note: The table provides an illustration of the entrepreneurial firms together with their partners. 
Additional data for all of the sample firms indicates that the mean value of the total number of 
project failures during the observation period for entrepreneurial firms is around 15, while for the 
partner firms, this figure stands at 126. 
 
 
Table 3. Abnormal returns 
Abnormal returns day Mean Std. Dev. T-Statistic 
t = -5 -0.0019 0.052777 -0.5688 
t = -4 -0.00159 0.044607 -0.5631 
t = -3 -0.00156 0.052255 -0.473 
t = -2 -0.00176 0.052682 -0.5284 
t = -1 -0.00155 0.048377 -0.5076 
t = 0 0.048913 0.117136 6.6024*** 
t = 1 -0.00096 0.059488 -0.2558 
t = 2 -0.0032 0.043371 -1.1652 
t = 3 0.003779 0.044145 1.3534 
t = 4 -0.00078 0.055028 -0.223 
t = 5 -0.0067 0.04853 -2.1818 
         N = 248; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
1 Abnormal returns 0.05 0.08 1.00 
                  
2 Project suspensions 0.51 1.32 0.09 1.00 
3 Project failures 0.13 0.12 -0.08 0.20* 1.00 
                
4 
Exploration alliance 
dummy N/A N/A 0.00 -0.07 0.03 1.00 
5 
Moderate-scale 
exploitation dummy N/A N/A -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.37* 1.00 
              
6 
Large-scale 
exploitation dummy  N/A N/A 0.13 -0.01 0.02 -0.48* -0.23* 1.00 
             
7 Past performance 3.62 3.52 0.08 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.11 1.00 
8 Technology quality  136.60 276.48 -0.01 0.17* 0.14 0.12 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 1.00 
9 Scientific signal 2.93 1.49 0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.22* 0.10 1.00 
10 Market signal 2.81 0.71 -0.16 -0.27* -0.01 0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.12 0.00 0.01 1.00 
11 Location signal N/A N/A 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.05 -0.10 0.03 -0.17 -0.14 0.26* -0.21* 1.00 
12 Firm age 10.00 4.85 -0.05 0.31* 0.16 0.08 -0.13 -0.04 0.13 0.28* -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 1.00 
       
13 Firm size 0.21 0.22 -0.09 0.25* 0.13 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.18* 0.51* 0.23 -0.04 0.09 0.14 1.00 
14 R & D scale 31.34 31.15 -0.03 0.13 0.07 -0.07 -0.02 0.16 -0.14 0.53* 0.14 -0.08 -0.14 0.00 0.69* 1.00 
15 Financial slack 6.63 9.08 0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.11 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.22* -0.19 1.00 
16 Alliance experience 7.56 12.05 -0.04 0.07 -0.11 -0.08 -0.03 0.13 -0.11 0.18* 0.05 0.01 -0.23 -0.06 0.32* 0.32* -0.09 1.00 
17 Potential milestone 380152 3072992 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 -0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.08 -0.03 0.05 0.07 0.12 -0.04 0.13 1.00 
18 Partner reputation N/A N/A 0.37* 0.10 0.00 -0.08 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.23* 0.06 -0.05 0.10 0.11 -0.02 0.11 0.05 1.00 
 
19 Partner failure 0.57 0.13 0.01 -0.12 0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.07 0.04 -0.17 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.08 -0.02 1.00 
 
Note: *Significant at the 5% level. N/A: not applicable. 
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Table 5. Results of multiple regression analyses of abnormal returns 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 VIF 
Firm age -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 2.66 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  
Firm size -0.200 -0.136 0.047 0.081 0.122 0.147 4.36 
(0.136) (0.121) (0.128) (0.129) (0.152) (0.123)  
R & D scale -0.004 -0.005 -0.010 -0.012 0.000 -0.002 2.67 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.011)  
Financial slack 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 2.45 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012)  
Alliance experience -0.006 -0.013 -0.022 -0.023 -0.025 -0.022 2.35 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)  
Potential milestone -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 1.67 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
Exploration alliance dummy -0.015 -0.016 -0.023 -0.025 -0.029 -0.033 1.77 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021)  
Large-scale exploitation dummy 0.010 0.014 0.015 0.024 0.005 0.032 2.10 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.035) (0.026) (0.027)  
Partner reputation 0.110** 0.111** 0.109** 0.101** 0.104*** 0.096*** 1.67 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.026) (0.025)  
Partner failure 0.058 0.075 0.115 0.108 0.109 0.024 2.69 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.070) (0.073) (0.079) (0.103)  
Scientific signal 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 -0.012 1.95 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)  
Market signal 0.005 0.008 0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.018 1.47 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)  
Location signal 0.007 -0.003 0.013 0.011 0.025 0.031 2.11 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027)  
Historical signal: past performance 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 1.66 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
Historical signal: technology quality 0.011 0.009 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 4.16 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)  
Prior project suspensions 0.023* 0.025* 0.007 0.027* 0.005 3.41 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)  
Prior project failures -0.195** -0.209** -0.307* -0.350** 2.59 
(0.068) (0.070) (0.113) (0.110)  
Prior project suspensions × Exploration alliance dummy 
  
0.029**  0.032 2.70 
    
(0.010)  (0.017)  
Prior project suspensions × Large-scale exploitation 0.044  0.046 1.55 
(0.043)  (0.032)  
Prior project failures × Exploration alliance dummy 0.253 0.289 2.59 
     
(0.150) (0.146)  
Prior project failures × Large-scale exploitation alliance 
   
-0.132 -0.128 1.52 
     
(0.207) (0.196)  
Partner failures × Exploration alliance dummy 0.029 2.28 
(0.149)  
Partner failures × Large-scale exploitation 0.589* 1.67 
      
(0.235)  
Constant 0.016 -0.018 0.009 0.053 0.044 0.146  
 
(0.066) (0.064) (0.077) (0.084) (0.077) (0.098)  
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.33 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.51  
Note: N = 248. The estimated coefficients and the robust standard errors (in parentheses below the estimates) 
have been adjusted for clustering by company. In Model 3-5 where the interaction effects are included, a 
moderate-scale exploitation alliance dummy is used as the reference group. Significance levels are two-
tailed. 
 
              * p  <  0.05   ** p  <  0.01   *** p  <  0.001   
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Table 6. The effect of prior project suspensions and failures  
on actual projects that were ultimately successful NPD launches 
Variables   
Firm age 0.00 
 (0.01) 
Past performance 0.01 
 (0.01) 
Financial slack 0.01 
 (0.00) 
Firm size 2.51*** 
 (0.60) 
Alliance experience -0.10 
 (0.06) 
R & D scale 0.00 
 (0.00) 
Technology quality 0.10* 
 (0.05) 
Location dummy 1.49*** 
 (0.36) 
Partner reputation 0.06 
 (0.11) 
Partner failure  0.26 
 (0.35) 
Lagged suspended projects 0.12* 
 (0.06) 
Lagged failed projects -0.04 
 (0.02) 
Constant  -0.18 
 (0.24) 
Note: Dependent variable=Ln(number of successful product launches); N=54, adjusted 
R2=0.81. The positive and significant sign of firm size suggests that larger firms achieve more 
successful launches. This is also true for technology quality and location dummy for firms based 
in Europe, and for project suspensions. Prior failed projects are negatively linked to successful 
launches.  The results remain robust after controlling for year fixed effect and firm fixed effects.  
As robustness checks, a Poisson regression was run using the number of successful 
product launches (a count variable) as the dependent variable, with other independent variables 
included above. The results remain largely unchanged. Bootstrapping regressions were run, and 
the substantive results remain largely unchanged.   
  * p  <  0.05   ** p  <  0.01    *** p  <  0.001   
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Figure 1. Drug discovery: time frame, and varying investments and risks    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from FDA (1999), and Chandy et al. (2006).   
 
 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Adapted from Connelly et al. (2011) and Rao, Chandy and Prabhu (2008).  
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Figure 3. A comparison of the life spans of failed projects, projects with no 
development reported, and suspended projects  
 
Note: As indicated by the blue dots in the figure, the number of months from the start to the final 
termination of a failed project is significantly larger than the number of months in which a project 
can keep its status as “no development reported” (as indicated by the region in the red box). Since 
the duration of project suspensions is less than or at the most, equal to the maximum number of 
months for which a project can be labelled as “no development reported,” their duration falls 
within the red box (i.e., between 0 and 18 months).  
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Figure 1. Drug discovery: time frame, and varying investments and risks
Source: adapted from FDA (1999), and Chandy et al. (2006).
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Figure 2. Conceptual map
Note: Adapted from Connelly et al. (2011); Rao, Chandy and Prabhu (2008).
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Figure 3. A comparison of the life spans of failed projects, projects with no
development reported, and suspended projects
Note: As indicated by the blue dots in the figure, the number of months from the start to the
final termination of a failed project is significantly larger than the number of months in which
a project can keep its status as “no development reported” (as indicated by the region in the
red box). Since the duration of project suspensions is less than or at the most, equal to the
maximum number of months for which a project can be labeled as “no development
reported,” their duration falls within the red box (i.e., between 0 and 18 months).
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